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The Obligation of Regulatory Stability in the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: 
How Far Does it Go? 
 
Dr Federico Ortino1 
 
I. Introduction 
In the world of foreign investment, the risk of ‘adverse regulatory change’ in the host State is 
one of foreign investors’ top so-called ‘political risks’.2 While there may be several 
techniques to address such political risk (including stabilization clauses3 or political risk 
insurance),4 foreign investors have recently relied on one of the key investment protection 
guarantees, the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard,5 which is found in most modern 
international investment treaties, concluded since the 1960s by States in order to promote 
foreign investment.6 Investors’ have often put forward two key arguments in order to claim 
that the FET standard provides for a guarantee or obligation of regulatory stability. First, 
foreign investors have claimed that the obligation to provide ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
entails “the obligation to maintain a stable legal framework for the investment”.7 Second, 
foreign investors have also argued that changes in the legal framework of the host State 
(including general laws and regulations) have “frustrated the investor’s legitimate 
expectations on the basis of which the investment was made and has thus breached the 
obligation to accord it fair and equitable treatment.”8 
 
While it is undisputed that the obligations “to provide a stable legal framework” and “to 
protect investors’ legitimate expectations (of stability)” have been recognized as specific 
                                                
1	 King’s College London; federico.ortino@kcl.ac.uk. The author would like to thank Holger 
Hestermeyer, Andrew Lang, Greg Messenger, Mona Pinchis, Lauge Poulsen and the participants at 
the ILAP workshop in January 2017 as well as the Journal’s anonymous reviewers. All errors remain 
my own. 
2 World Investment and Political Risk 2013 (Washington, DC: MIGA, World Bank Group), at 19-22 
and 41 (“58 percent named adverse regulatory changes as the most important political risks they face 
in the next three years”). 
3 Abdullah Faruque, ‘Validity and Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses: Legal Protection vs. Functional 
Value’, 23 Journal of International Arbitration 317 (2006); Piero Bernardini, ‘The Renegotiation of 
the Investment Contract” 13(1) ICSID Review 411 (1998); Thomas Wälde and George N’Di, 
‘Stabilising International Investment Commitments’, 31 Texas International Law Journal 215 (1996); 
Nagla Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Revisited: A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-Term 
International Commercial Transactions (Martin Nijhoff, 1995). 
4 Kathryn Gordon “Investment Guarantees and Political Risk Insurance: Institutions, Incentives and 
Development” OECD Investment Policy Perspectives (2008) available at 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/insurance/44230805.pdf. 
5 While foreign investors often also face unilateral modification (or termination) of so called 
investment contracts (concluded between the investor and the host State), the present paper focuses on 
changes in general laws and regulations (or general regulatory framework). 
6 In order to address adverse regulatory change, foreign investors have also relied on other provisions 
commonly found in international investment treaties, such as the provisions on expropriation. 
However, the focus of this paper is on the FET standard, only. 
7 Bayindir v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para. 239-40. 
8 Occidental v Ecuador I, Award, 1 July 2004, para. 181. 
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applications of the FET standard,9 it is submitted here that the extent to which the FET 
standard disciplines ‘regulatory change’ in the absence of an express stabilization 
commitment from the host State is far from clear. The paper’s premise is that conceptually 
there exist at least two alternative understandings of the guarantee of regulatory stability as 
part of the FET provision. According to one view, the FET provision requires strict 
regulatory stability, thus the existence of a change in the regulatory framework applicable to 
the investment is sufficient to trigger a violation of the FET provision. According to a second 
view, the FET provision only imposes a soft regulatory stability obligation, where the 
violation analysis has to consider the merit (ie., the procedural fairness and substantive 
reasonableness) of the regulatory change under review. 
 
Early decisions by investment tribunals interpreting the FET standard contain statements 
supporting either the “strict” or “soft” understanding of a stability obligation. One of the 
paradigmatic examples of a tribunal interpreting the FET provision as requiring strict 
regulatory stability is Occidental v Ecuador I. Having stated that “[t]he stability of the legal 
and business framework is […] an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”,10 the 
Occidental v Ecuador I noted that a determination of whether there is a breach of the FET 
standard is premised on whether or not the host State has “alter[ed] the legal and business 
environment in which the investment has been made.”11 On the other hand, the 2006 decision 
in Saluka v Czech Republic adopted a softer, more deferential, interpretation of regulatory 
stability as part of FET, focusing, at least in part, on the fairness/reasonableness of the 
regulation under review.12 In the view of the Saluka tribunal, in order to be protected, the 
investor’s expectations “must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the 
circumstances”13 and a determination of a breach of the FET standard “requires a weighing of 
the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the Respondent’s 
legitimate regulatory interests on the other.”14 
 
While more recent tribunals regularly acknowledge the host State’s inherent right to regulate 
in the public interest, it is suggested here that there is still a level of ambiguity with regard to 
the extent to which the FET standard disciplines regulatory change. Various recent disputes 
concerning, for example, the introduction of plain packaging legislation for cigarettes in 
Uruguay, jurisprudential changes in intellectual property protection in Canada and changes in 
                                                
9 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: OUP 
2012, second edition), at 145. 
10 The Occidental v Ecuador I tribunal relied on the clear statement found in the preamble of the 
underlying treaty (the 1993 Ecuador-United States BIT) that FET “is desirable in order to maintain a 
stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources”. 
Occidental v Ecuador I, Award, 1 July 2004, at para 183. 
11 Occidental v Ecuador I, Award, 1 July 2004, para. 191. See Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment: Today 's Contours’, 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 7 (2013), at 22. See also 
Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: OUP 2012, 
second edition), at 145. 
12 Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006. 
13 Saluka v Czech Republic, ibid. para. 304. 
14 Saluka v Czech Republic, ibid. para. 306. 
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solar energy subsidies in various EU countries have highlighted this fundamental ambiguity. 
 
The persistent ambiguity with regard to the extent to which the FET standard disciplines 
‘regulatory change’ feeds in to the current debate about whether the protections granted to 
foreign investors by investment treaties impose excessive restraints on host States’ ability to 
regulate in the public interest.15 In this debate, one should keep in mind the role of 
perceptions, particularly those of a wider (perhaps non-expert) audience including local 
legislators, regulators, and communities. The perception that investment treaties may be (or 
have at times been) interpreted to include an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict 
sense (detached from an analysis of the underlying public policy justifications) would be 
enough to create serious concerns. It is thus not surprising that the contracting parties of the 
2016 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) felt the need to 
expressly clarify that a modification to laws, which negatively affects an investment or 
interferes with an investor's expectations, does not amount to a breach of any investment 
protection obligation.16 
 
The aim of the paper is thus to shed light on the way investment treaty tribunals have 
imposed on host States a guarantee of regulatory stability under the FET provision (whether 
through the obligation to provide a stable legal framework or through the obligation to 
protect investors’ legitimate expectations of stability). The paper traces the origin and 
evolution of such regulatory stability guarantee as part of the FET provision in the practice of 
investment tribunals. The paper focuses, in particular, on assessing whether and, if so, the 
extent to which the FET standard has been interpreted by investment tribunals as an 
obligation of regulatory stability in the strict sense, that is whether a change in the host 
State’s regulations affecting the foreign investment is sufficient to establish a violation of the 
FET clause without the need to consider the reason(s) underlying such change. 
 
The paper’s main argument is as follows: despite the fact that investment tribunals have 
increasingly recognized the need to find a better balance between protecting foreign investors 
from adverse regulatory changes and the right of host States to regulate in the public interest, 
one can find recent arbitral decisions where the role of regulatory stability within the FET 
standard remains at best ambiguous and which thus fail to assuage the fears that the FET 
standard may indeed function as imposing an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict 
sense. 
                                                
15 See M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: CUP 2010, 3rd 
edition), at 355; Moshe Hirsch, ‘Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization Clause: 
Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International Investment Law’, 12 J. World Inv. 
& Trade 783 (2011); Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, ‘Investor-State Contracts, Host-State 
“Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law’, 24 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 361 (2013); 
Michele Potestà, ‘Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and 
the Limits of a Controversial Concept’, 28 ICSID Review (2013), at 34; Christopher Campbell, 
‘House of Cards: The Relevance of Legitimate Expectations under Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Provisions in Investment Treaty Law’, 30 Journal of International Arbitration (2013), at 379. 
16	See Article 8.9, paragraph 2 of EU-Canada CETA. 
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This article is structured as follows: after this introduction, the second section briefly 
elaborates on the conceptual distinction between ‘strict’ and ‘soft’ stability obligations. The 
third section examines the origin of the obligation of stability, positing that a handful of early 
investment arbitral decisions do appear to have interpreted the FET provision to include the 
obligation of regulatory stability in the strict sense. The fourth section examines the 
subsequent arbitral practice, which seems to reverse the early decisions and rely instead on a 
soft understanding of regulatory stability obligation. The fifth section focuses on the most 
recent arbitral practice and shows how some investment tribunals still fail to clearly set out 
the role of regulatory stability within the FET standard. 
 
II. The conceptual framework: ‘strict’ versus ‘soft’ stability obligation 
 
As noted above, investors often put forward two separate grounds in order to claim a breach 
of the FET provision because of an adverse regulatory change: 1) the host State has violated 
the obligation to provide a stable regulatory framework and 2) the host State has violated the 
obligation to protect investors’ legitimate expectations (including the expectation that the 
regulatory framework would not change during the life of the investment). 
 
There are at least two ways in which either ground above could be understood in principle. 
With regard to the argument based on the obligation to provide a stable regulatory 
framework, one can understand such obligation akin to a stabilization clause stricto sensu, 
which is at times agreed between the foreign investor and the host State in order to ‘freeze’ 
the law applicable to the investment at the time of the signature of the underlying contract.17 
Reading the FET provision to include such a strict stability obligation would in practice mean 
that FET requires a host State to compensate the foreign investor in case of a change in the 
general regulatory framework detrimental to such investor (even if no specific stabilization 
commitment had been made to the investor by the host State). Alternatively, such stability 
obligation can be understood in a softer sense as one requiring that any regulatory change in 
the host State be ‘reasonable’ or ‘reasonably related to a legitimate public policy objective’. 
Under this alternative reading, compensation would be due under the treaty not because of a 
detrimental change in the regulatory framework, but because the measure introducing the 
change is judged unreasonable. While such reasonableness test may take different forms 
(including procedural fairness, substantive rationality, or proportionality tests),18 the 
distinctive feature of this alternative understanding is that the analysis will include an 
examination of the merit of the regulatory change. 
 
                                                
17 “A stabilisation clause stricto sensu intends to ensure that the law applicable to the petroleum 
contract will not change over the life of the project. This is a more traditional approach which tries to 
impose an absolute block on the legislative competence of the host state.” Faruque, ‘Validity and 
Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses’, above n ?, at 319. 
18 See Valentina Vadi Proportionality, Reasonableness and Standards of Review in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
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Similarly, with regard to the argument that the host State has violated the obligation to 
protect the investors’ legitimate expectations, two alternative understandings exist in 
principle. On the one hand, one could argue that foreign investors can legitimately rely on the 
general expectation that the regulatory framework applicable at the time the investment is 
made will not be subsequently modified (at least in a substantial manner) by the host State to 
the detriment of the foreign investment. On the other hand, one could argue that investors’ 
expectations would be worthy of protection under the FET provision only if they are (a) 
legitimate and reasonable under the specific circumstances and in any event (b) balanced vis-
à-vis the host State’s right to regulate in the public interest. In other words, under the latter 
view, a blanket expectation about no (at least substantial) changes in the applicable 
regulatory framework does not exist and the focus is instead on, again, the merit (or 
fairness/reasonableness) of the regulatory change. 
 
The paper’s premise is that these two sets of alternative understandings highlight two 
conceptually-distinct norms. According to one view, the FET provision requires strict 
regulatory stability, thus the mere existence of a change in the regulatory framework 
applicable to the investment is sufficient to trigger a violation of the FET provision. Under 
this view, the relevant question at issue would be whether the new law regulating, for 
example, the production and sale of a certain pharmaceutical product has modified (perhaps 
substantially) the regulatory regime applicable to the foreign investor. 
 
According to the other view, the FET provision imposes a softer notion of regulatory stability 
by focusing on (or at least including in the analysis) the procedural fairness and substantive 
reasonableness of the regulatory change rather than on the mere existence of change. Under 
this view, the relevant question would be whether the new law on pharmaceutical products, 
for example, has been adopted in accordance with due process and is rationally justified on 
the basis of a legitimate public policy (see Table 1 below). 
 
 Strict stability Soft stability 
Regulatory stability 
requirement 
Existence of change Lack of fairness and/or 
reasonableness/proportionality 
Protection of investors’ 
expectations (of stability) 
Existence of change Lack of fairness and/or 
reasonableness/proportionality 
Table 1: Two distinct norms stemming from the FET provision 
 
There are of course shades of each understanding. A strict stability obligation may be subject 
to the condition that the change in the regulatory framework be of a certain magnitude 
(excluding, for example, minor changes). Similarly, a soft stability obligation may be subject 
to various degrees of review, for example, along the lines of the various tests provided for by 
the proportionality principle (suitability, necessity, cost-benefit balancing).19 
 
                                                
19 See Caroline Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration: Balancing 
Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy (Oxford: OUP 2016). 
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Nevertheless, it is clear that from the perspective of the foreign investor, a strict stability 
obligation would afford a very high level of protection vis-à-vis the risk of adverse regulatory 
change (as the investor will be compensated for the mere existence of such change). 
Conversely, a soft stability obligation would afford a greater degree of discretion to the host 
State as, at a minimum, the existence of an FET violation (and the duty to compensate the 
investor) would depend in relevant part on an assessment of the merits of the new regulation 
at issue. 
 
III. Linking FET and regulatory stability: the early attempt 
 
In the early 2000s (particularly between 2003-2006), at a time when investment treaty 
arbitration was still in its infancy, one can find a line of arbitral decisions that appear to put 
forward an interpretation of the FET provision, which includes the obligation of regulatory 
stability in the strict sense.20 These tribunals relied principally on (i) the need to protect 
investors’ expectations and/or (ii) statements in treaty preambles linking FET with 
‘stability’.21 For example, the tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico notoriously stated in a 2003 
decision that the FET provision requires the contracting parties to provide to international 
investments “treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment”, including the expectation that the 
host State acts “in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its 
relations with the foreign investor”.22 
 
In 2004, as noted above, the tribunal in Occidental v Ecuador I expressly stated that the 
stability of the legal and business framework is an essential element of fair and equitable 
treatment. The tribunal relied on the clear statement found in the preamble of the underlying 
treaty (the 1993 Ecuador-United States BIT) that FET “is desirable in order to maintain a 
stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic 
resources”.23 One of the key questions at issue in Occidental I was whether the host State had 
breached the FET provision by modifying the ability of certain exporters to claim a VAT 
refund. The tribunal explained its finding in the following terms: 
 
The relevant question for international law in this discussion is […] whether the legal 
and business framework meets the requirements of stability and predictability under 
international law. It was earlier concluded that there is not a VAT refund obligation 
                                                
20 Potestà, above n ??, at 24. 
21 Express references to ‘stability’ in investment treaties are rare. They are usually contained in the 
preamble (see for example some United States treaties) or in the protection guarantee (see in 
particular Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty). More infra.  
22 Tecmed v Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003, para. 154. An even earlier tribunal in the context of 
finding a violation of fair and equitable treatment in the context of Article 1105 NAFTA, referred to 
the host State’s failure “to ensure a transparent and predictable framework” as well as to the investor’s 
“expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly”. Metalclad v Mexico, Award, 30 August 2000, 
para. 99. 
23 Occidental v Ecuador I, Award, 1 July 2004, at para 183. 
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under international law, […] but there is certainly an obligation not to alter the legal 
and business environment in which the investment has been made. In this case it is the 
latter question that triggers a treatment that is not fair and equitable. [emphasis 
added]24 
 
In 2005, the tribunal in CMS v Argentina similarly affirmed that “a stable legal and business 
environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment.”25 The CMS tribunal also 
specifically relied for its interpretation of the FET provision on the preamble of the 
applicable investment treaty (the 1991 United States-Argentina BIT), where the contracting 
parties had expressed their agreement “that fair and equitable treatment of investment is 
desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use 
of economic resources”.26 
 
A few other decisions in 2006-07, relying on these precedents, affirmed that the stability 
requirement is a key element of FET.27 In PSEG v Turkey, for example, the Tribunal found 
that the host State conduct had seriously breached the FET obligation in light of “the ‘roller-
coaster’ effect of the continuing legislative changes.”28 In Sempra v Argentina, the tribunal 
captured the key issue as follows: “What counts is that in the end the stability of the law and 
the observance of legal obligations are assured, thereby safeguarding the very object and 
purpose of the protection sought by the treaty”.29 The Sempra tribunal also discarded the 
relevance of any justifications for introducing such changes in the legal and business 
framework. Having found that the emergency legislation implemented by Argentina had, 
beyond any doubt, substantially changed the legal and business framework under which the 
investment was decided and implemented, the Sempra tribunal concluded that there had been 
an “objective breach” of the FET provision “even assuming that the Respondent was guided 
                                                
24 Occidental v Ecuador I, Award, 1 July 2004, at para 191. 
25 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 274. Very similar approach and language is found in 
LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras 124 and 131 (“Tribunal must 
conclude that stability of the legal and business framework is an essential element of fair and 
equitable treatment in this case”), Enron v Argentina, Award, 22 May 2007, paras 259-60 (“the 
Tribunal concludes that a key element of fair and equitable treatment is the requirement of a ‘stable 
framework for the investment’, which has been prescribed by a number of decisions”) and Sempra v 
Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, para. 300 (“What counts is that in the end the stability of the 
law and the observance of legal obligations are assured, thereby safeguarding the very object and 
purpose of the protection sought by the treaty”). 
26 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 274. This is true also for the LG&E and Enron 
decisions. 
27 Enron v Argentina, Award, 22 May 2007, paras 259-60 (“the Tribunal concludes that a key element 
of fair and equitable treatment is the requirement of a ‘stable framework for the investment’, which 
has been prescribed by a number of decisions”). Very similar language can be found in LG&E v 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras 124 and 131 (“Tribunal must conclude that 
stability of the legal and business framework is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment in 
this case”). 
28 PSEG v Turkey, Award, 19 January 2007, para. 250. 
29 Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, para. 300. 
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by the best intentions”.30 
 
The distinguishing key feature of these various decisions is the fact that the tribunals assessed 
the existence of an alleged breach of the FET provision due to a change in the general 
regulatory framework of the host State without any reference to, or examination of, the 
reasons or justifications for such change. In other words, these tribunals’ assessment focused 
on the existence of a change. However, while these early decisions do appear to make 
reference to a strict notion of regulatory stability imposed by the FET standard, a closer 
analysis raises some doubts about the nature of the regulatory stability obligation actually 
imposed by these tribunals. 
 
First of all, while the Tecmed decision appears to represent one of the first leading precedents 
underlying these early decisions establishing a stability obligation, that decision never 
expressly mentions the concept of ‘stability’ or ‘stable legal framework’. As part of the host 
State obligation to provide treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were 
taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment, the Tecmed tribunal 
focused instead on the expectation of ‘consistency’ and ‘transparency’.31 Furthermore, the 
Tecmed tribunal defines a ‘consistent act’ as one “without arbitrarily revoking any pre-
existing decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to 
assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business 
activities.”32 While one may still criticise the Tecmed’s consistency standard as being 
excessive or aspirational,33 it is not altogether clear whether the Tecmed tribunal read FET as 
imposing an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict sense. 
 
Second, in the reasoning of these early tribunals, the relationship between the investor’s 
distinct arguments regarding stability requirement and the investor’s expectations (of 
stability) remains unclear. On the one hand, some tribunals appear to treat the two together by 
including predictability, consistency or stability as some of the investor’s expectations that 
should be protected by the FET provision.34 On the other hand, at least one tribunal seemed 
to distinguish the two components of FET (‘regulatory stability’ and ‘protection of the 
investor’s expectations’).35 
 
Third, some of these early tribunals were not clear whether a change in the regulatory 
                                                
30 Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, para. 303-04. See also Enron, Award, 22 May 
2007, para. 268. 
31 Tecmed v Mexico, at 154. 
32 Tecmed v Mexico, at 154. 
33 Zac Douglas, ‘Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex’, 22 Arbitration International 27 (2006), at 28. 
34 See Tecmed v Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003, para. 154. 
35 LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 127. To note also that, despite the 
reference to the relatively well-known legal concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ in the arguments of 
the disputing parties, these early tribunals refrained from expressly referring to such concept and 
instead limited their references to a broader notion of investors’ ‘expectations’. See for example 
Occidental v Ecuador I, para. 181. 
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framework violated the FET standard only in the presence of a specific stabilization 
commitment made by the host State. For example, having determined that the emergency 
legislation under review “did in fact entirely transform and alter the legal and business 
environment under which the investment was decided and made”,36 the CMS v Argentina 
tribunal stated as follows: “It is not a question of whether the legal framework might need to 
be frozen as it can always evolve and be adapted to changing circumstances, but neither is it a 
question of whether the framework can be dispensed with altogether when specific 
commitments to the contrary have been made.”37 The highlighted sentence is particularly 
important in terms of understanding what kind of obligation the CMS tribunal read in to the 
FET provision. On the one hand, reading the FET provision as imposing an obligation of 
stability in the strict sense would mean that a violation would occur simply if the host State 
introduces an adverse (and possibly substantial) change in the regulatory framework 
applicable to the investment. On the other hand, limiting a finding of violation of the FET 
provision when the host State has modified the regulatory framework in the presence of a 
stabilization commitment (as hinted by the CMS tribunal in the above quoted sentence) 
greatly narrows the scope of the stability obligation under FET: in the latter sense, one could 
argue that the FET provision merely guarantees the stabilization commitment already 
undertaken by the host State, but it does not represent a stabilization commitment in itself. 
 
Aside from the lack of clarity and elaboration with regard to the extent to which the FET 
standard provides for a guarantee vis-à-vis regulatory change, it is nevertheless submitted that 
there was enough in these early decisions to justify the argument (or fear) that the FET 
provision could actually embody an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict sense akin 
to a contractual freezing clause. In a study published in 2012, UNCTAD concluded that some 
investment tribunals “have gone so far as to suggest that any adverse change in the business 
or legal framework of the host country may give rise to a breach of the FET standard in that 
the investors’ legitimate expectations of predictability and stability are thereby 
undermined.”38 
 
IV. Subsequent arbitral practice rejects the link between FET and strict 
regulatory stability: the refinement of the doctrine of investor’s legitimate 
expectations 
 
The handful of decisions that, in the infancy of investment treaty arbitration, appeared to read 
the FET provision to include an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict sense remain 
limited in number39 and have been overtaken by a subsequent, large arbitral practice denying 
the existence of such strict stability obligation as part of the FET provision. 
                                                
36 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 275. 
37 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 277 [emphasis added]. 
38 UNCTAD Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II (Geneva, United Nations, 2012) at 67. 
39 In one sense, this group of decisions was possibly also limited in authorship as most of them were 
rendered by tribunals chaired by Professor Orrego Vicuna (Occidental, CMS, Enron and Sempra). 
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The initial blow to a broad interpretation of the FET provision hinged on the rejection of the 
view that the FET provision protects the investor’s general expectation of regulatory stability. 
In 2006, as noted above, the tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic was one of the first 
investment tribunals to reject reading the FET provision as imposing an obligation of 
regulatory stability in the strict sense.40 In the view of the Saluka tribunal, an interpretation of 
the FET provision requiring the protection of a too large set of investor’s expectations 
(including the expectation of legal stability) would be “inappropriate and unrealistic”. In the 
view of the Saluka tribunal, in order to be protected, the investor’s expectations “must rise to 
the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the circumstances”.41 Noting that no 
investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
made remain totally unchanged, the Saluka tribunal specified that “the host State’s legitimate 
right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into 
consideration as well.”42  
 
In 2007, the ad hoc Committee in MTD v Chile referred to the Tecmed tribunal’s apparent 
reliance on the foreign investor’s unqualified expectations as the source of the host State’s 
obligations as “questionable”.43 In other words, investors’ expectations sic et simpliciter 
cannot create legal obligations (including strict stability obligations). 
 
Furthermore, in 2008, the tribunal in Continental v Argentina was the first to oppose reading 
too much in the link between FET and stability referred to in the preamble of some 
investment treaties (such as the United States-Argentina BIT). The Continental tribunal noted 
that such reference in the preamble does not constitute a legal obligation in itself, nor can it 
be properly defined as an object of the treaty. In the view of the tribunal, while stability of the 
legal framework is undoubtedly conducive to attracting foreign investments, “it would be 
unconscionable for a country to promise not to change its legislation as time and needs 
change, or even more to tie its hands by such a kind of stipulation in case a crisis of any type 
or origin arose.”44 
 
There are plenty of statements in subsequent arbitral decisions (a) rejecting a broad 
interpretation of the FET provision that includes a strict regulatory stability obligation and (b) 
affirming instead the host State’s prerogative to modify its laws and regulations as part of its 
inherent right to regulate.45 For example, in the context of determining a claim based on the 
                                                
40 Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 302. 
41 Saluka v Czech Republic, ibid. para. 304. 
42 Saluka v Czech Republic, ibid. para. 305. 
43 MTD v Chile, Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007, at 67. 
44 Continental v Argentina, Award, 5 September 2008, para. 258 (“Such an implication as to stability 
in the BIT’s Preamble would be contrary to an effective interpretation of the Treaty; reliance on such 
an implication by a foreign investor would be misplaced and, indeed, unreasonable.”) 
45 Several scholars agree: Moshe Hirsch, ‘Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization 
Clause: Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International Investment Law’, 12 
Journal of World Investment and Trade (2011) at 806 (“In the absence of stabilization clauses, 
investment tribunals are not inclined to interpret FET clauses as effectively equivalent to stabilization 
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FET provision, the tribunal in Parkerings v Lithuania stated that: “It is each State’s 
undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has the 
right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion.”46 In a similar vein, the tribunal in 
EDF v Romania stated that the investor “may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a 
kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes in the host State’s legal and 
economic framework.”47 Similarly, the tribunal in Total v Argentina stated that the parties to 
an investment treaty “do not thereby relinquish their regulatory powers nor limit their 
responsibility to amend their legislation in order to adapt it to change and the emerging needs 
and requests of their people in the normal exercise of their prerogatives and duties. Such 
limitations upon a government should not lightly be read into a treaty which does not spell 
them out clearly nor should they be presumed.”48 The El Paso v Argentina tribunal most 
clearly rejected an interpretation of the FET provision that includes an obligation of 
regulatory stability in the strict sense noting the following:  
 
[T]he Tribunal cannot follow the line of cases in which fair and equitable treatment 
was viewed as implying the stability of the legal and business framework. Economic 
and legal life is by nature evolutionary. […] 
[I]t is inconceivable that any State would accept that, because it has entered into BITs, 
it can no longer modify pieces of legislation which might have a negative impact on 
foreign investors, in order to deal with modified economic conditions and must 
guarantee absolute legal stability. In the Tribunal’s understanding, FET cannot be 
designed to ensure the immutability of the legal order, the economic world and the 
social universe and play the role assumed by stabilisation clauses specifically granted 
to foreign investors with whom the State has signed investment agreements.49 
 
The bulk of the arbitral practice (following from the Saluka decision) shows that the starting 
point of the analysis with regard to the investor’s claim of regulatory stability under the FET 
provision was the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ rather than a broad legal stability 
obligation (possibly linked to investors’ expectations).50 Moreover, such arbitral practice has 
                                                                                                                                                  
clauses, and regulatory changes alone are insufficient in binding the host states to compensate foreign 
investors harmed by such changes”); Ursula Kriebaum, ‘FET and Expropriation in the (Invisible) EU 
Model BIT’, 15 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2014) at 471 (“In recent years, tribunals 
have moved towards a more reserved approach concerning the stability limb of fair and equitable 
treatment and have moved to a more cautious approach concerning the FET standard and the right to 
regulate. In other words, they have stressed the need for States to maintain a regulatory space”); 
Joshua Paine, ‘On Investment Law and Questions of Change’, 19 Journal of World Investment and 
Trade 173 (2018). 
46 Parkerings v Lithuania, Award, 11 September 2007, para. 332. 
47 EDF v Romania, Award, 8 October 2009, para. 217. 
48 Total v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, para. 115. 
49 El Paso v Argentina, Award, 31 October 2011, paras. 352 and 367-68. See further Hirsch, above, at 
793-799. 
50 See Potesta’, above; Caroline Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State 
Arbitration: Balancing Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy (Cambridge, CUP 2015) at 
74; Simon Maynard, ‘Legitimate Expectations and the Interpretation of the ‘Legal Stability 
Obligation”’, 1 European Investment Law and Arbitration Review (2016) at 109-111; McLachlan, 
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interpreted the obligation to protect investors’ legitimate expectations to exclude a guarantee 
of stability in the strict sense by referring to three specific factors. 
 
The first factor referred to by investment tribunals in order to determine the legitimacy of the 
investor’s expectation (of regulatory stability) is the existence of a specific promise or 
representation of stability given by the host State and relied upon by the investor. For 
example, according to the tribunal in EDF v Romania, “[e]xcept where specific promises or 
representations are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a bilateral 
investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes in the host 
State’s legal and economic framework. Such expectation would be neither legitimate nor 
reasonable.”51 Accordingly, the investor’s expectation that the general regulatory framework 
at the time in which the investment is made will not be subject to change (detrimental to its 
investment) does not deserve treaty protection under the FET provision at least unless 
specific promises or representations of regulatory stability have been made by the host 
State.52 
 
A second factor often referred to by investment tribunals in evaluating the legitimacy of 
investors’ expectations worthy of protection under FET is whether the adverse regulatory 
change under review is in itself reasonable or reasonably related to a legitimate public policy. 
The tribunal in Impregilo v Argentina, whose eminent members disagreed on several key 
issues, agreed on the following: 
 
the term “fair and equitable treatment”, as it appears in the present BIT and in other 
similar BITs, is intended to give adequate protection to the investor’s legitimate 
expectations. [...] [T]he legitimate expectations of the investors […] have to be 
evaluated considering all circumstances. In the Tribunal’s understanding, fair and 
equitable treatment cannot be designed to ensure the immutability of the legal order, 
the economic world and the social universe and play the role assumed by stabilization 
clauses specifically granted to foreign investors with whom the State has signed 
investment agreements. […] The legitimate expectations of foreign investors cannot 
be that the State will never modify the legal framework, especially in times of crisis, 
but certainly investors must be protected from unreasonable modifications of that 
legal framework.53 
 
The key legal issue identified by the Impregilo tribunal is not whether the host State had 
                                                                                                                                                  
Shore, Weiniger International Investment Arbitration – Substantive Principles (Oxford, OUP 2017 
second edition) at 309 et seq. 
51 EDF v Romania, Award, 8 October 2009, para. 217. See also Total v Argentina, Decision on 
Liability, 27 December 2010, para. 117. 
52 See also Parkerings v Lithuania, para. 332 (“Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of 
a stabilization clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the 
regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investment.”) and Paushok v 
Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, para. 305. 
53 Impregilo v Argentina, Award, 21 June 2011, paras 285, 290-91. 
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introduced a (substantial) change in the general regulatory framework to the detriment of the 
foreign investment, but rather whether that change was indeed reasonable in light of the 
various circumstances and interests at issue.54 
 
Third, some tribunals have subjected the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations 
to a balancing act that takes in to account, next to investors’ legitimate or reasonable 
expectations, the host State’s right to regulate. For example, the tribunal in Perenco v. 
Ecuador noted the following:  
 
Many cases hold that a central aspect of the analysis of an alleged breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard is the investor’s reasonable expectations as to the 
future treatment of its investment by the host State. […] The search is for a balanced 
approach between the investor’s reasonable expectations and the exercise of the host 
State’s regulatory and other powers.55 
 
Based on these various pronouncements, it can be argued that, despite those few early 
decisions that appeared to easily embrace a strict stability obligation, subsequent arbitral 
practice has shown more deference vis-à-vis the host State’s right to regulate and supported a 
softer understanding of FET as a guarantee of regulatory stability. In particular, arbitral 
tribunals’ focus on (a) the existence of a stabilisation commitment or promise, (b) the 
reasonableness of the host State measure and/or (c) the need to balance investor’s 
expectations and the host State’s right to regulate represent strong evidence that many 
subsequent investment tribunals have not endorsed a reading of the FET provision (and the 
related doctrine of legitimate expectations) that would include an obligation of regulatory 
stability in the strict sense. 
 
V. FET, regulatory change and recent arbitral practice: persistent ambiguity 
 
                                                
54 Parkerings v Lithuania, para. 332 (“What is prohibited however is for a State to act unfairly, 
unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power.”); Micula v Romania, Final 
Award, 11 December 2013, para. 529 (“In the Tribunal’s view, the correct position is that the state 
may always change its legislation, being aware and thus taking into consideration that: (i) an 
investor’s legitimate expectations must be protected; (ii) the state’s conduct must be substantively 
proper (e.g., not arbitrary or discriminatory); and (iii) the state’s conduct must be procedurally proper 
(e.g., in compliance with due process and fair administration).”); Charanne v Spain, Award, 21 
January 2016, paras. 510 and 513 (“an investor has a legitimate expectation that, when modifying the 
existing regulation based on which the investment was made, the State will not act unreasonably, 
disproportionately or contrary to the public interest.”). See Maynard, above, at 113-114 for the 
suggestion to apply a reasonableness test to the legal stability obligation. 
55 Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador 
(Petroecuador), Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Liability, 12 September 2014, para. 
560. See Lemire v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 10 January 2010, paras 284-85; El 
Paso v Argentina, Award, 31 October 2011, para. 358 (“a balance should be established between the 
legitimate expectation of the foreign investor to make a fair return on its investment and the right of 
the host State to regulate its economy in the public interest.”). See further Jonathan Bonnitcha, 
Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties (Cambridge, CUP 2014) at 175-90. 
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This section aims to determine whether the softer reading of the regulatory stability 
obligation described in the previous section has been consolidated in the most recent arbitral 
practice. This examination reveals how some investment tribunals still fail to clearly set out 
the role of regulatory stability within the FET standard. In particular, (a) they fail to take a 
clear position on whether or not FET includes a requirement of regulatory stability in the 
strict sense and (b) they fail to clarify the kind of regulatory change that would entail a breach 
of the FET provision. 
 
(a) While investors continue to argue that FET includes a requirement of regulatory 
stability in the strict sense, some tribunals fail to take a clear position on whether 
or not FET includes such a requirement 
 
In their claims brought against host States, investors still regularly argue for a broad reading 
of the FET provision that includes an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict sense. In 
Philip Morris v Uruguay, a case involving various legislative measures aimed at restricting 
the use of brands on cigarette packages, claimants argued that investors’ expectations may 
rise inter alia from “general statements, the legal framework, legislation” and that “specific, 
explicit promises to an investor […] are not necessary”.56 Furthermore, in Philip Morris v 
Uruguay, while they accepted that “it is a State’s prerogative to exercise its regulatory and 
legislative powers”, the claimants argued that those powers “must not be ‘outside of the 
acceptable margin of change’.”57 To support their claims, investors usually refer to any of the 
early decisions that, as examined above, contained language that appeared to support a broad 
reading of the FET provision.58 
 
While it is unsurprising that claimants argue for a broad reading of FET and base their 
arguments on the most supportive precedents, it is nonetheless disappointing that some 
arbitral tribunals do not take a clearer stance (one way or the other) with regard to the extent 
to which the FET provision disciplines adverse regulatory change. The tribunals’ decisions in 
Philip Morris v Uruguay and Antaris v The Czech Republic are good examples of this. 
 
As noted above, the Philip Morris v Uruguay tribunal was confronted with the investor’s 
claim that various legislative measures introduced by Uruguay restricting the use of brands 
on cigarette packages violated the FET provision in the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT principally 
because (a) the measures were arbitrary, (b) they frustrated the investor’s legitimate 
expectations and (c) they failed to provide a stable and predictable legal system. Having 
decided to consider the latter two grounds “in the same context due to their interrelation”,59 
the Philip Morris v Uruguay tribunal stated as follows: 
 
                                                
56 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 342. 
57 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 346 referring to El Paso v Argentina, Award. 
58 Claimants in Philip Morris v Uruguay refer to Tecmed and Occidental v Ecuador I, see Award, 8 
July 2016, paras 340 and 346; claimants in Antaris & Gode v The Czech Republic refer to Tecmed, 
CMS, Occidental I, and Enron (see Award, 2 May 2018, para. 266). 
59 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 421. 
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422. It is common ground in the decisions of more recent investment tribunals that the 
requirements of legitimate expectations and legal stability as manifestations of the 
FET standard do not affect the State’s rights to exercise its sovereign authority to 
legislate and to adapt its legal system to changing circumstances. 
423. On this basis, changes to general legislation (at least in the absence of a 
stabilization clause) are not prevented by the fair and equitable treatment standard if 
they do not exceed the exercise of the host State’s normal regulatory power in the 
pursuance of a public interest and do not modify the regulatory framework relied 
upon by the investor at the time of its investment “outside of the acceptable margin of 
change.”60 
 
While these statements do reflect the greater sensitivity shown by investment tribunals vis-à-
vis the host State’s right to regulate, one can still find language there that may be perceived 
as supporting a rather strict stability obligation. Particularly, both the tribunal’s express 
reference to a ‘requirement of legal stability’ (which is in addition to the requirement of 
legitimate expectations and non-arbitrariness) and its express recognition that a modification 
of the regulatory framework ‘outside of the acceptable margin of change’ is indeed prohibited 
by the FET provision fail to completely clarify whether or not FET includes an obligation of 
regulatory stability in the strict sense. Without any elaboration of what is exactly the 
‘acceptable’ margin of change, it remains unclear what kind of regulatory change would 
entail a breach of the FET provision, particularly as one could read the latter ground 
(‘modification of the regulatory framework outside of an acceptable margin’) as alternative 
to (and thus different from) the former one (‘exceeding the exercise of the host State’s normal 
regulatory powers’). 
 
This uncertainty is carried over to the tribunal’s ultimate findings rejecting Philip Morris’ 
FET claim. The (majority of the) tribunal distinguished between the legitimate expectation 
claim and the legal stability claim, and appeared to base its rejection of the latter claim on the 
finding that the effect of the measures under review had not been to modify the stability of the 
host State’s legal framework.61 Thus, one can still advance the argument that the majority of 
the tribunal accepted, at least in principle, a reading of the FET provision as a guarantee of 
regulatory stability in the strict sense.62 
 
In the second example, the tribunal in Antaris v The Czech Republic was confronted with the 
claim that the host State’s modification of its incentive regime in the photovoltaic sector had 
violated the FET provision in the Energy Charter Treaty and the Germany-Czech Republic 
BIT because the policy change violated the obligation (a) to provide a stable and predictable 
legal framework, (b) to protect an investor’s legitimate expectations and (c) not to impair the 
                                                
60 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016, paras. 422-23. 
61 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016, paras. 433-34. 
62 Another recent example of such (possible) implicit recognition may be found in Eli Lilly and 
Company v Canada, Final Award, 16 March 2017, paras 386-389. 
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investment through arbitrary and unreasonable behaviour.63 
 
The Antaris tribunal’s analysis begins with the recognition of the existence of a vast arbitral 
practice (which the disputing parties had referred to) interpreting and applying the FET 
standard. The tribunal then puts forward thirteen “general propositions” stemming from such 
practice, which include the following:  
 
(1) There will be a breach of the FET standard where legal and business stability or 
the legal framework has been altered in such a way as to frustrate legitimate and 
reasonable expectations or guarantees of stability. […] 
(3) A claimant must establish that (a) clear and explicit (or implicit) representations 
were made by or attributable to the state in order to induce the investment […]. 
(6) Provisions of general legislation applicable to a plurality of persons or a category 
of persons, do not create legitimate expectations that there will be no change in the 
law […]. 
(7) An expectation may be engendered by changes to general legislation, but, at least 
in the absence of a stabilization clause, they are not prevented by the fair and 
equitable treatment standard if they do not exceed the exercise of the host State’s 
normal regulatory power in the pursuance of a public interest and do not modify the 
regulatory framework relied upon by the investor at the time of its investment outside 
the acceptable margin of change. 
(8) The requirements of legitimate expectations and legal stability as manifestations 
of the FET standard do not affect the State’s rights to exercise its sovereign authority 
to legislate and to adapt its legal system to changing circumstances. […] 
 
While the Antaris tribunal does acknowledge that several of these propositions “overlap with 
each other” and that its decision to ultimately reject the investors’ FET claims “is not based 
on all of those propositions”, the tribunal fails to recognise the (at least potential) 
inconsistency of several of those propositions and thus to take a clear position on whether, 
and the extent to which, FET includes an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict 
sense.64 
 
(b) While claimants always seem to argue that the regulatory change under review is 
substantial or drastic, some investment tribunals fail to clarify the kind of change 
that per se qualifies for a breach of the FET provision 
 
A second controversial issue revolves around the kind of regulatory change that is required in 
                                                
63 Antaris v Czech Republic, Award, paras 262-264. 
64 The dissenting arbitrator seems to highlight the inconsistency of the tribunal’s decision. Antaris v 
Czech Republic, Dissenting Opinion, 2 May 2018. Furthermore, the two decisions in Philip Morris 
and Antaris are also examples of the failure by arbitral tribunals to elaborate the relationship, if any, 
between the investor’s claim based on the obligation to provide a stable legal framework and the 
claim based on the obligation to protect its legitimate expectations (Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 
at para. 421 and Antaris, Award, at para. 363). 
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order to determine a violation of the FET provision. At the beginning of the paper, I posited 
the conceptual distinction between a strict and soft stability obligation, where the former 
focuses on the existence of a regulatory change and the latter entails (at least in part) an 
analysis of the merit (ie., fairness or reasonableness) of the measure under review (ie., the 
change in regulation). 
 
In their FET claims, investors often highlight the magnitude of the regulatory change put in 
place by the host State (a) by arguing that the host State has “profoundly altered the stability 
and predictability of the investment environment”,65 (b) by referring to the legal framework 
as “exceptionally unstable”,66 or (c) by describing the regulatory change as ‘radical’.67 
Similarly, the claimants in Blusun v Italy, another recent dispute involving the photovoltaic 
sector, emphasised the relentlessness of the regulatory changes by describing their claim as 
follows: 
 
Our claim is not that Italy’s legislation had to remain immutable, unchanged, written 
in stone. This case is not about regulatory change; it’s about regulatory turbulence. It 
concerns the fact that during the two years between permissible and legally 
impossible, the legal framework for the project constantly changed, leaving no period 
of stability in which the requisite capital investment for a project of this size could be 
realised.68 
 
Notwithstanding the various qualifiers (‘profound’, ‘exceptional’, ‘radical’, ‘constant’) used 
by foreign investors to describe the adverse regulatory changes introduced by the host State, 
these claimants appear to rely on a strict notion of regulatory stability, albeit possibly a more 
limited one, as only ‘substantial’ changes will constitute a breach of the FET. 
 
Confronted with such claims, the investment tribunal’s key task is to clarify the notion of 
regulatory stability that applies for purposes of determining a violation of the FET provision. 
In other words, in the absence of a stabilization commitment, does the adverse regulatory 
change violate the FET provision because it is a radical or substantial change or because it is 
                                                
65 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 267. See also El Paso v Argentina, Award, 2011, 
para. 351, where the tribunal refers to the following quote by the investor: “Claimant does not call 
into question Argentina’s right to change its laws or regulations. It has never been Claimant’s position 
that the BIT imposes an absolute obligation not to alter the regulatory framework. […] But the 
complete alteration of the regulatory framework in a manner that does not reasonably protect existing 
capital investments promoted by the government necessarily frustrates the legitimate expectations of 
investors.” 
66 Mamidoil v Albania, Award, 30 March 2015, para. 590. 
67 Eli Lilly and Company v Canada, Final Award, 16 March 2017, para. 227 (“Claimant argues that 
the promise utility doctrine is a radical departure from Canada’s traditional utility standard […]”). See 
also El Paso v Argentina, Award, 2011, para. 390 (“in [the claimant’s] view, the decisions and 
regulations in issue […] that brought a radical alteration of key rules, effectively eviscerated the 
existing regulatory frameworks, and therefore exceeded normal regulatory powers.”). See also Eiser v 
Spain, Award, 4 May 2017, para. 358 (“The drastic changes adopted by Respondent defeated 
Claimants’ legitimate expectations of stability […]”). 
68 Blusun v Italy, Award, 27 December 2016, para. 320. 
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an unreasonable or disproportionate change? Unfortunately, an examination of a few recent 
awards shows that some tribunals still fail to clarify the kind of regulatory change that would 
qualify for a breach of the FET provision. 
 
For example, as noted above, while it ultimately rejected the investor’s claim, the Philip 
Morris v Uruguay tribunal seems to accept in principle that changes to the regulatory 
framework are in violation of the FET provision if they are “outside of the acceptable margin 
of change”.69 The tribunal however does not clarify what it means by ‘acceptable’ margin of 
change: does the regulatory change become ‘unacceptable’ because it is ‘substantial’ (or even 
‘total’) or is it unacceptable because the change is ‘unreasonable’ (or disproportionate)? The 
Philip Morris v Uruguay tribunal’s succinct reasoning for rejecting the investor’s FET claim 
regarding the ‘stability of the legal framework’ only adds to the uncertainty as the tribunal 
focuses on the fact that the measures under review had “limited impact” on the investor’s 
business and the effect of the measures under review “had not been such as to modify the 
stability of the Uruguayan legal framework.”70 
 
Similarly, the tribunal in Eli Lilly v Canada was confronted with a claim that the Canadian 
court’s interpretation of the utility requirement under Canadian patent law, and in particular 
their adoption of the promise utility doctrine in the mid-2000s, allegedly departing 
dramatically from prior Canadian patent law, violated, inter alia, the FET standard in Article 
1105 NAFTA. While the Eli Lilly tribunal ultimately rejected the investor’s claim as the 
investor failed to demonstrate a “fundamental or dramatic change” in Canadian patent law, it 
remains unclear what the tribunal meant for a ‘dramatic’ change. Looking at the various 
factors examined by the tribunal (including the utility requirement in Canadian jurisprudence, 
relevant Canadian regulatory practice and statistical evidence), one can argue that the Eli 
Lilly tribunal was indeed focusing on whether there had been a substantial change in law, 
rather than whether the change in law was arbitrary or disproportionate.71 However, some of 
the tribunal’s conclusions (stressing the ‘incremental and evolutionary’ nature of the change 
                                                
69 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016, para. 423. It should be noted that the phrase ‘outside 
of the acceptable margin of change’ comes from the El Paso v Argentina tribunal, in the context of a 
long and (perhaps over-) elaborated decision, which contains some apparently conflicting statements: 
compare “the legitimate expectations of a foreign investor can only be examined by having due regard 
to the general proposition that the State should not unreasonably modify the legal framework or 
modify it in contradiction with a specific commitment not to do so” (para. 364) with “[t]here can be 
no legitimate expectation for anyone that the legal framework will remain unchanged in the face of an 
extremely severe economic crisis. No reasonable investor can have such an expectation unless very 
specific commitments have been made towards it or unless the alteration of the legal framework is 
total” (para. 374) [emphasis added]. 
70 Philip Morris v Uruguay, Award, paras. 433-34. 
71 See Robert Howse “Eli Lilly v Canada: A Pyrrhic Victory Against Big Pharma” International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog, 26 March 2017, (“On those exceptional but usually very important 
occasions when high courts reconsider well-established judicial doctrines in the face of social, 
economic, environmental or other forms of rapid change we experience in the world today, they must 
now beware that any basic or fundamental reorientation of their jurisprudence could force that state's 
government to pay out millions or even billions to foreign corporations in the guise of an 
"expropriation" having occurred [or a breach of the FET provision].”) 
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and suggesting some of the reasons that may have led to such change) seem to imply instead 
a focus on the reasons for (or the reasonableness of) the change.72 
 
A third example of a tribunal’s failure to clarify the kind of regulatory change required to 
established a violation of the FET provision is the decision in Eiser v Spain. In that 
arbitration, the tribunal was confronted with the claim, brought exclusively under the ECT, 
that the host State had violated the FET provision because of the drastic changes it had 
introduced in the subsidies provided to solar energy producers. In line with the more 
deferential approach shown by most tribunals since Saluka, the Eiser tribunal recognised that 
“absent explicit undertakings […] investment treaties do not eliminate States’ right to modify 
their regulatory regimes to meet evolving circumstances and public needs” and that “the FET 
standard does not give a right to regulatory stability per se.”73 The tribunal, however, added 
two further statements that appear to qualify, in important ways, the previous one. The 
tribunal first stated that the FET provision “does protect from a fundamental change to the 
regulatory regime in a manner that does not take account of the circumstances of existing 
investments made in reliance on the prior regime.”74 Second, the tribunal added that, while 
the ECT did not bar Spain from making appropriate changes, “the ECT did protect Claimants 
against the total and unreasonable change that they experienced here.”75 
 
The key question put forward above presents itself, once again. Is the Eiser tribunal relying 
on a strict notion of regulatory stability (albeit more limited as only ‘fundamental’ or ‘total’ 
changes will constitute a breach of the FET) or is the tribunal instead relying on a soft notion 
of regulatory stability where those qualifiers merely represent the evidence of an 
unreasonable or disproportionate behaviour by the host State? The language used by the 
tribunal is not helpful in fully understanding what is the kind of change required and thus the 
nature of the obligation imposed on the host State through the FET provision. The ambiguity 
is also reinforced by the fact that, in its ultimate finding of violation of the FET provision, the 
Eiser tribunal refers to the new regulatory approach both as “unprecedented and wholly 
different” and as “profoundly unfair and inequitable […] stripping Claimants of virtually all 
of the value of their investment.”76 While one can argue that the tribunal’s finding of 
violation was based both on the extent of the regulatory change at issue and the 
disproportionate nature of that change, it is not clear whether an unprecedented change 
would in principle be sufficient to breach the FET provision. It thus remains unclear whether 
                                                
72 Eli Lilly v Canada, Award, 16 March 2017, para. 386 (“Taken as a whole, the evidence before the 
Tribunal shows that Canada’s utility requirement underwent incremental and evolutionary changes 
[…]. Over those years, there was an increase in the number of utility-based challenges of 
pharmaceutical patents, which appears to have increased the pace of the development of the law most 
relevant to that sector.”). On the other hand, the fact that the tribunal proceeded next to examine 
whether the utility requirement under Canadian law is ‘arbitrary’ may undermine this second reading 
of what constitutes a ‘dramatic’ change. 
73 Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg SARL v Spain, Award, 4 May 2017, 
para. 362. 
74 Eiser, para. 363. 
75 Eiser, para. 363. 
76 Eiser, para. 365. 
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Compared to some of the statements found in the decisions of ‘early’ tribunals, there is no 
doubt that most arbitral practice of the last ten years has expressly recognized the host State’s 
right to regulate in the public interest including the right to modify its laws and regulations. 
The paper has nonetheless shown that investment tribunals have retained, as part of the FET 
standard, both the obligation to provide a stable legal framework and the obligation to protect 
the investor’s legitimate expectations. Moreover, the paper has advanced the argument that 
several investment tribunals remain ambiguous with regard to the extent to which the FET 
standard disciplines regulatory change in the absence of a stabilization commitment. In 
particular, it is not clear whether tribunals interpret the FET provision as imposing a strict 
stability obligation that focuses on the existence of an adverse regulatory change or a soft 
stability obligation that focuses instead on the regulatory change’s fairness, reasonableness or 
proportionality. 
 
The decisions in Philip Morris v Uruguay, Ely Lilly v Canada, Eiser v Spain, Blusun v Italy, 
and Antaris v Czech Republic, analysed above, are all examples of such ambiguity. In none of 
these decisions, it is clear whether the tribunal viewed the FET provision as protecting 
foreign investors from ‘adverse regulatory change’ or from ‘unreasonable or 
disproportionate’ new regulation. This ambiguity remains even when the tribunal highlights 
the ‘seriousness’ or ‘radicality’ of the regulatory change under review (as in Ely Lilly and 
Eiser), as it is not clear whether or not the ‘seriousness’ or ‘radicality’ assessment implies an 
examination of the (lack of) ‘reasonableness’ or ‘proportionality’ of the new regulation under 
review. 
 
The underlying issue that the paper seeks to highlight is the apparent disregard shown by 
several investment tribunals of the fundamental difference between a strict stability guarantee 
and a soft stability guarantee. While the former is premised on the existence of a (serious or 
drastic) regulatory change, the latter is premised on the procedural fairness and substantive 
reasonableness of the new regulation introduced by the host State. In the absence of an 
express provision in the applicable investment treaty, a reading of the obligation to provide 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ that does not clearly exclude the existence of a strict stability 
guarantee will continue to raise serious concerns from many quarters with regard to the 
excessive restraints imposed by investment treaties on the host State’s right to regulate. In 
this sense, several investment tribunals (and not just those from the ‘early’ days of investment 
treaty arbitration) are to be blamed for failing to clarify the content and scope of the FET 
standard in addressing adverse regulatory change and to assuage the fears that the FET 
standard may indeed function as imposing an obligation of regulatory stability in the strict 
sense. 
 
It is difficult to identify in definitive terms the underlying causes of this persistent failure. 
 21 
Does it stem from the open-ended nature of the key investment treaty standards (such as 
FET) and the decentralized nature of international investment adjudication? Does it stem 
from the existence of a still unresolved conflict between those supporting a reading of 
investment treaties as instruments providing foreign investors with a broad set of guarantees 
(including strict regulatory stability) and those that see those treaties as affording a narrower 
set of protections to foreign investment (not going beyond a prohibition of arbitrary, 
unreasonable or disproportionate conduct)? Or is it the very insistence by tribunals to employ 
the vague concept of a ‘stability obligation’? 
 
Underlying causes aside, one consequence of this state of affairs should be highlighted here. 
The persistent lack of clarity with regard to FET and regulatory stability may definitely lead 
policy makers to realize that this failure cannot be resolved, at least at the appropriate pace, 
through the evolving nature of arbitral practice and that instead it is up to them to solve it. 
 
